Dr Suresh P. Sethi, Redovni profesor na Odseku za menadžment u operacionim istraživanjima, Univerzitet u Teksasu, Dalas (Sjedinjene Američke Države). Direktor Centra za inteligentne mreže snabdevanja (C4iSN).
He has written 11 books and published over 400 research papers in the fields of manufacturing and operations management, finance and economics, marketing, and optimization theory. He teaches a course on optimal control theory/applications and organizes a seminar series on operations management topics. He initiated and developed the doctoral programs in operations management at both University of Texas at Dallas and University of Toronto. He serves on the editorial boards of several journals including Production and Operations Management and SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. He was named a Fellow of The Royal Society of Canada in 1994. Two conferences were organized and two books edited in his honor in 2005-6. Other honors include: IEEE Fellow (2001), INFORMS Fellow (2003), AAAS Fellow (2003), POMS Fellow (2005), IITB Distinguished Alum (2008), SIAM Fellow (2009), POMS President (2012), INFORMS Fellows Selection Committee (2014-16), Alumni Achievement Award, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University (2015).
Tema predavanja po pozivu:
Hierarchical and Mixed Leadership Games for Dynamic Supply Chains: Applications to Cost Learning and Co-op Advertising
We consider two applications dynamic stochastic supply chains. The first application is a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer’s second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the problem as a two-period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer’s production decisions, and on the retailer’s procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. The second application studies a novel manufacturer-retailer cooperative advertising game where, in addition to the traditional setup into which the manufacturer subsidizes the retailer's advertising effort, we also allow the reverse support from the retailer to the manufacturer. This is modeled as a mixed leadership game in which one player is a leader on some decisions and a follower on other decisions. We find an equilibrium that can be expressed by a solution of a set of algebraic equations. We then conduct an extensive numerical study to assess the impact of model parameters on the equilibrium.